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Descent into Authoritarianism: Barriers to
Constitutional Rule in Belarus
By ERIC R. REED*
Introduction
The collapse of the Soviet Union has allowed the legal community to
observe the creation and early trials of several new constitutions. One
notable commentator referred to East-Central Europe as a "constitutional
laboratory."' Few expected the rule of law to graft easily onto
governments and peoples ruled for decades by authoritarian regimes. As
expected, the progress made by these states in the last decade varies.
Belarus arguably achieved least, and remains classified generally as a state
reverting to authoritarianism. 2  President and former collective farm
manager Alexander Lukashenka's political abuses deserve some share of
blame for this backsliding. However, additional political, social, and
judicial factors hinder Belarus' transition to the rule of law.
This note analyzes Belarus' failure to reform and its reversion to
Soviet-style authoritarianism. It first provides a historical synopsis of
Alexander Lukashenka's election as President and his subsequent
consolidation of constitutional power. It then explores the political, social,
and judicial barriers to constitutional rule of law in Belarus. Finally, this
note concludes that reform is not likely under the current regime, and
would remain difficult under a new regime.
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2005.
1. Ret R. Ludwikowski, "Mixed" Constitutions - Product of an East-Central
European Constitutional Melting Pot, 16 B.U. INT'L L.J. 1, 6 (1998).
2. See Cynthia Alkon, The Cookie Cutter Syndrome: Legal Reform Assistance Under
Post-Communist Democratization Programs, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 327, 342-43 (2002).
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I. Brief Contemporary History of Belarus: Alexander
Lukashenka's Election as President
A. Election of President Alexander Lukashenka and the 1996
constitutional referendum
The perceived failure of economic development led to the dismissal
and indictment of the reform-minded Belarusian Chairman of Parliament
Stanislav Shushkevich in 1994.3 Belarus subsequently held its first
presidential election, in which voters elected parliament member and
former collective farm manager Alexander Lukashenka, who ran on an
anti-corruption platform.4 The international community recognized the
election as "relatively free and fair."5
Lukashenka's relationship with the West floundered almost
immediately. By 1995 the American media considered Lukashenka a
"progressing paranoiac.",6 He accused the United States of playing a role in
the Soviet Union's breakup and conducting sabotage activities in Belarus.
7
Belarus' domestic harmony fared little better under the new president. In
1995, Lukashenka suggested introducing direct presidential rule to
circumvent his opposition, which he considered "entrenched" in
parliament.8 The Belarusian parliament appreciated the magnitude of the
impending constitutional crisis, and in September 1996 sought to
compromise with Lukashenka.9 At this time Lukashenka's parliamentary
faction planned to increase presidential power through referendum and
amendment of the 1994 constitution.1°  The parliament suggested a
"Conciliatory Constitutional Commission" as an alternative; the proposed
body would decide upon and then present the amendments to the
3. Michael P. Malloy, Colloquium: Shifting Paradigms: Institutional Roles in a
Changing World, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 1911, 1926 (1994).
4. Alexander Lukashuk, Explaining Lukashenko's Hold on Power, 7 E. EUR. CONST.
REV. 43, 44 (1998); Dario Thuburn, 14-Country EU Travel Ban on Belarus Leadership
Approved, WORLD MARKETS ANALYSIS, Nov. 20, 2002, available at LEXIS News
(summarizing Lukashenka's background and rise to power).
5. Human Rights Watch, Background: Republic of Belarus, at
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/belarus/Belarus-03.htm> (visited 09/10/04).
6. Yuras Karmanov, Lukashenko Intends to Introduce Direct Presidential Rule,
SEGODNYA, Nov. 1, 1995, at 3.
7. id.
8. Id.
9. Sergie Anisko, Parliament Makes Move to Settle Conflict with Head of State,
SEGODNYA, Sept. 21, 1996, at 1.
10. Id.
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parliament - not the voters - for approval.' 1
The proposed referendum alarmed the EU and United States.12 Even
Russia attempted to broker a deal between Lukashenka and parliament,
13
and hoped that "the art of political compromise [would] replace the
ambitions and confrontations among politicians." 14 Meanwhile, the word
"impeachment" had begun circulating in Belarus, and was the subject of a
10,000-strong democratic rally in Minsk in July 1996.15 Seven leading
political parties decried the proposed constitutional amendments, and
accused Lukashenka of attempting to establish a dictatorship through the
referendum. 16  On the eve of the referendum a minority of parliament
futilely attempted to impeach the president.' 7 But it was too late. Belarus
held the referendum between November 9 and 24, 1996, with voters
ostensibly amending the Belarusian Constitution in what Parliament
Chairman Semyon Sharetsky called "a farce and abuse of the people."'
8
B. Subsequent reversion to authoritarianism
Since the Soviet Union's dissolution, Belarus slid into
authoritarianism "after a good start."'19 Some now describe the current
Belarusian government as "the one remaining ultra-authoritarian regime" in
Europe. 20 The country's relationship with Western powers deteriorated
swiftly in the wake of Lukashenka's consolidation of power. After the
referendum, the Parliamentary Assembly of Europe suspended Belarus'
"specially invited" status over growing human rights abuses.2 ' The
11. Id.
12. Phil Reeves, EU Sounds Alarm at Belarus Showdown, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Nov. 20, 1996, at 16.
13. Helen Womack, Belarus Poll Paves Way to Dictatorship, THE INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Nov. 25, 1996, at 11.
14. See Reeves, supra note 12.
15. Anatoly Kozlovich, How Would You Say "Impeachment" in Belorussian?,
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, July 31, 1996, No. 31, at 2.
16. Id.
17. Vladimir Kuznechevsky, Politicians Put the Fat in the Fire; But What About the
People?, ROSSIISKAYA GAZETA, Nov. 21, 1996, at 1, 7.
18. Mikhail Pastukhov, Presidential Abuse of Powers in Belarus, 4 PARKER SCH. J. E.
EuR. L. 479, 479 (1997).
19. Alkon, supra note 2, at 344. See generally Thomas Carothers, The End of the
Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEM. 5 (2002) (describes and analyzes the inherent challenges in
democratization).
20. A Few Dinosaurs; Serbia, Belarus and Moldova, WORLD AND I, Dec. 1, 2002, at 26
(available at LEXIS News).
21. Sergei Glotov, Belorussia Being Driven Away from the Council of Europe, PRAVDA,
Jan. 9, 1997, at 1-2.
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European Union Foreign Ministers Council likewise expressed concern
over Lukashenka's human rights violations when the Council imposed a
mild political and economic blockade on Belarus Since the
constitutional referendum, Belarus "has seen an alarming trend towards
greater state intervention in religious affairs"23 and increased subordination
24
of lawyers. United States assistance to Belarus dropped 70% between
Lukashenka's election in 1994 and the present.25 Belarus' relations with
the West hit a new low in 1998, when Lukashenka evicted American,
German, British, French, Italian, and IMF officials from the Drozdy
diplomatic compound in Minsk.26
II. Barrier One: Lukashenka's Abuses of Power
A. Freedom of speech abuses
Belarusian slander laws restricting speech freedoms predated
Lukashenka's rise to power in 1994. In 1992, a state enterprise sued
Supreme Soviet (Belarusian parliament) Deputy Evgeniy Novikov, who
earlier alleged corruption within the enterprise. 27 The court fined Novikov
for making the corruption claim and the judge later personally sued
Novikov when he criticized the judge's decision.28 Later, an Afghan war
veteran, along with relatives of veterans who perished in the war, sued
writer Svetlana Aleksievich when a local newspaper published excerpts of
her book describing Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan.29  The Belarusian
government also sued the Belarusian correspondent for Russian newspaper
Kommersant.
30
Lukashenka's regime further restricted the freedom of the press after
coming to power. The government currently owns almost all major
newspapers, and most independent newspapers are "relatively small and
22. Anna Baneva, Europe Declares Cold War on Belarus, KOMMERSANT-DAILY, Sept.
18, 1997, at 4.
23. Alexander Vashkevich, The Relationship of Church and State in Belarus: Legal
Regulation and Practice, 2003 BYUL. REV. 681, 708 (2003).
24. Human Rights Watch, Republic of Belarus: The Subordination of Lawyers, at
<www.hrw.org/reports/1997/belarus/Belarus-07.htm> (visited 09/10/04).
25. U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Belarus, at
<www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5371 .htm> (visited 09/10/04).
26. id; see Lukashuk, supra note 4.
27. RETr A. LUDWICKOWSKI, CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN THE REGION OF FORMER SOVIET
DOMINANCE 100 (1996).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id
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lack adequate funding."31  The same is true in broadcast media.32
Lukashenka's attitude towards media is summed up by his statement that
he "supports a free press as long as it is responsible and helps [his]
presidency." 33  In the months before the 1996 referendum, Lukashenka
excluded political opponents from using the government-run media while
simultaneously using it himself.
34
A renewed crackdown on independent media in Belarus occurred
during the 2001 presidential election. Before the election, the government
confiscated an independent newspaper's publishing equipment, detained
those distributing opposition newspapers, and arrested pro-opposition
protestors.35 Authorities also seized hundreds of thousands of copies of
two other independent newspapers and shut down an entire printing
house. 36  Circulation of a pro-Lukashenka newspaper increased
dramatically and was distributed free of charge just prior to election day.3 7
Lukashenka "dominated the [2001 presidential] campaign" using state-run
media38 and garnered a reported 76% of the vote.39
Slander laws written into the amended constitution continue to arm the
regime with an anti-media weapon. A media law enacted in 1997 prohibits
publishing "information damaging the honor and dignity of government
officials whose status has been established by the constitution. ' 4° In 2002,
31. Id. at 100-01.
32. Id. at 101.
33. Id.
34. See Reeves, supra note 12.
35. See Ethan Burger, The Recognition of Governments Under International Law: The
Challenge of the Belarusian Presidential Election of September 9, 2001 for the United
States, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REv. 107, 120-121 (2003); Peter Baker & Susan B.
Glasser, President Claims Victory in Belarus: Protestors Say Election Was Rigged, WASH.
POST, Sept. 10, 2001, at AI3.
36. Constitutional Watch: Belarus, 10 E. EUR. CONST. R. 4, 6 (2001).
37. See Belarusian Association of Journalists, The Daily Update on Media Situation in
Belarus Ahead of Presidential Elections: Government Newspaper Campaigns to Re-Elect
Lukashenka, at <http://www.baj.ru/indexe.htm>, select Archives "2001" then "Sept. 5,
2001" (visited 09/16/04); see also Burger, supra note 35; Constitutional Watch: Belarus,
supra, note 36.
38. Constitutional Watch: Belarus, supra, note 36 at p. 5.
39. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Republic of Belarus
Presidential Election: OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report
[hereinafter "OSCE Final Report"], at 5-6, at
<http://www.osce.org./documents/odihr/2001/10/1237_en.pdf> (visited 09/16/04).
40. Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 1999-2000, Report on Belarus (Adrian
Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl & Aili Piano, eds.), at
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/pdfdocs/research/nitransit/belarus.PDF> at 120 (visited
09/16/04).
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a court found the editor-in-chief of independent weekly newspaper
Pahonya and one of its journalists guilty of slandering President
Lukashenka.41 Both were sentenced to forced labor under police
supervision.42 Only months later, opposition newspaper Nasha Svaboda
suffered "a huge financial blow" when it lost a libel suit brought by a
government official.43 The court fined the newspaper $55,000 and the
writer $2,700 - a significant sum considering Belarus' median monthly
income is approximately $200.44
B. Electoral abuses
Once voting on the 1996 constitutional referendum commenced, the
media considered the result a "foregone conclusion. '' 45  Lukashenka
dismissed Viktor Gonchar, Chairman of the Central Commission on
Elections and National Referendums, just two weeks before the referendum
and after Gonchar had complained of irregularities among the thousands of
absentee ballots already cast.46 In the two weeks between Gonchar's
removal and the election, the president's armed guard barricaded the
Central Commission.4 7 Claims of egregious voter fraud and violations of
absentee ballot procedure naturally followed,48 and cast doubt on the
legitimacy of the amended constitution and the governmental changes
made in accordance with the new constitution.49
The post-referendum electoral legal framework now suffers from
strong pro-incumbency bias, as evidenced by the 2001 presidential election.
Several presidential decrees severely restricted the rights of other
candidates in this election; essentially, the president could and did create
many of the rules in the election in which he participated. 50 For example,
political parties, trade unions, and other organizations needed government
permission to organize a demonstration with an expected attendance over
41. Constitutional Watch: Belarus, 11 E. EuR. CONST. R. 4, 6 (Summer 2002).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Nations in Transit, supra, note 40 at p. 136; see generally World Bank Country
Brief, Belarus, at <http://www.worldbank.org.by/> (visited 09/16/04).
45. See Reeves, supra note 12.
46. Pastukhov, supra note 18 at 480. See also Reeves, supra note 12.
47. Pastukhov, supra note 18 at 480.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 381.
50. Constitutional Watch: Belarus, supra note 36, at p. 5. See also Electoral Code of
the Republic of Belarus, available at
<http://mail.ncpi.gov.by:8081/vybory/eng/legal/code.htm> (visited 09/16/04).
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1,000.51 Lukashenka threw several other obstacles in the way of opposition
candidates in the 2001 election. Each candidate received approximately
$12,500 in state funding, and could not use additional funds other than
those distributed to each equally from a common election fund.52 Official
campaigning lasted only twenty-five days, and consisted of few organized
events actually including the candidates.53  These obstacles proved
insurmountable to the opposition, especially when combined with the
president's media control. The OSCE's official report of the 2001 election
highlighted several flaws in the electoral process.54 The report observed a
campaign environment that intimidated opposition activists, domestic
observation organizations, and independent media.55  The report also
criticized the legislative framework that hampered independence of the
election administration and the integrity of vote tabulation.56
C. Centralization ofpower
The 1996 constitutional referendum and subsequent amendments
greatly expanded executive powers in the Belarusian government. The
amendments created a bilateral parliament in which the president appoints
eight, or one-sixth, of the senators.57 The amendments also gave the
president the right to dissolve the legislative chamber - essentially, the
power to eliminate the representative assembly and rule through a
subordinated Senate.58 The president now must approve the initiation of all
laws that "may reduce state resources, or increase expenditures," 59 and
perhaps most significantly, may now issue binding decrees and regulations
without outside approval.60  The president appoints and recalls all
ministers, with only the Prime Minister's appointment requiring
parliament's approval.6' The 1996 amendments created such intense
conflict within the Belarus Constitutional Court that several of the judges
resigned.62 When Lukashenka swore in judges for the new Constitutional
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. OSCE Final Report, supra note 39, at 1-2; see also Burger, supra note 35, at 126.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. BELR. CONST. arts. 90, 91, available at
<http://www.president.gov.by/eng/map2/state/const/> (visited 09/16/04).
58. See art. 93; see also Ludwickowski, supra note 1, at 39.
59. See art. 99.
60. See arts. 85, 101; see also Ludwickowski, supra note 1, at 39.
61. See art. 106.
62. Bill Bowring, Politics Versus the Rule of Law in the Work of the Russian
2004]
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Court in March 1997, only four of eleven served on the pre-referendum
court.6 3
D. Abuse of the decree power
Before the 1996 referendum the Constitutional Court took issue with
Lukashenka's use of rule by decree, which was fast becoming the
president's "chief form of regulation." 64  The court pronounced four
decrees unconstitutional in 1996; most concerned civil rights and
liberties.65 The new version of the Constitution expressly granted the
President power to issue such binding decrees. Former Constitutional
Court judge Mikhail Pastukhov regards this power as "nothing other than
the abuse of power of office.",66 Pastukhov also contends that rule by
decree violates article 6 of the Belarus Constitution, which "establishes the
principle of separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial
branches.,67 Lukashenka went on to pass more than ten decrees in the first
half of 1997,68 and used several decrees to create obstacles for opposition
candidates during the 2001 presidential election. 69 The president now uses
this power for nearly every purpose he sees fit; recent uses include
reorganizing a newspaper's editorial board 70 and reducing the number of
representatives in city government.71  Presidential Decree 40 allows
confiscation of one's property if merely suspected of "harming the state";
"harm" is not defined.72 An OSCE observer notes that many "temporary"
decrees stay in effect for many years.73
E. Lukashenka and the future of constitutional rule in Belarus
President Lukashenka's attitude toward the Belarusian constitution
sets a dangerous precedent for future presidential administrations. His
willingness - even eagerness - to amend the document betrays his attitude
Constitutional Court, in THE RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL EUROPE 257, 262 (Ji'i Pfibdfi and
James Young, eds., 1999).
63. Id.
64. Pashtukhov, supra note 18, at 489.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 492.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 493.
69. See Burger, supra note 35.
70. Pahtukhov, supra note 18, at 489.
71. Id. at490.
72. Constitution Watch: Belarus, 9 E. EUR. CONST. R. 4, 6 (2000).
73. Id.
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that the constitution is little more than a tool to serve his political ends. His
continued use of presidential decree shows that he views himself as the
ultimate source of law in Belarus. Looking at the broad and diverse areas
in which Lukashenka has issued such decrees - from elections to city
government and media censorship - he appears to place no limit on this
power. Lukashenka's method of rule effectively ignores the role of the
judiciary and parliament. He openly displays his indifference to those
concepts enumerated in the Belarus constitution that impede his wielding
complete control over every aspect of government and society - namely,
the separation of powers. This paves the way for increased centralization
of executive authority and solidifies Belarus' notoriety as Europe's last
remaining autocracy.
The outlook for political reform and recession of executive power is
not optimistic. As leader of a state still in its constitutional and political
infancy, Lukashenka has molded Belarus' government into a frightening
pseudo-legal structure that gives lip service to democratic institutions such
as free speech and elections. The danger lies in the fact that his regime is
not quite illegal enough.74 Belarusians elected the president legitimately in
1994, and although the 2001 election was flawed in many respects and
heavily criticized, most data show Lukashenka indeed won the most votes,
even if by a smaller margin then he claimed.75
Lukashenka's control of the media, the Central Election Commission,
and the legal framework of elections all but guarantee his regime's
"victory" in any future elections or referendums. This may allow him to
change any aspect of the constitution in the executive's favor with the
appearance of voter approval. For these reasons, Alexander Lukashenka
presents the largest barrier to the advancement of constitutional rule in
Belarus. Little hope for reform exists under his regime, as illustrated by its
disregard of enumerated constitutional principles, manipulation of
legitimate institutions, and willingness to sidestep the legislative process
through presidential decree. Unfortunately, the population of Belarus has
provided Lukashenka with little incentive to change this course until
recently.
74. See generally Burger, supra note 35.
75. Id. at 124-25.
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III. Barrier Two: Social Factors and the Rule of Law
A. Social attitudes toward the rule of law in the Soviet Union and
Belarus
1. Constitutional law in the Soviet Union and Belarus
No precedent exists for the transition from communist totalitarianism
to democracy.76 One must recognize the unique challenges faced by states
in the former Soviet Union when analyzing Belarus' struggles in
constitutional law. Seventy-five years of direct Soviet rule imprinted
socialist legal paradigms deeply into the minds and institutions of Belarus.
In Soviet constitutional law, legal theorists considered legislation the
sole source of law.77 Soviet constitutions created a concentrated power
structure designed to serve "the unconstrained rule of the Communist
parties. ' '78 Parliament theoretically held immense power,79 but in reality
this power was centralized far from the people. First, elections were not
free, and opposition political parties banned.8°  Second, Socialist
constitutions transferred parliament's powers to "President's councils" or
state councils that also exercised executive powers. 8' Thus, the separation
of powers in post-Socialist states may be a hard pill to swallow for officials
who ruled, and for people who were governed, for decades without such
structure.82
Traditional modem Eastern European constitutional law lacks
"natural" or "higher law," which formed the basis of classical constitutions
such as the United States Constitution. 83  Higher law doctrine placed
certain "inviolable principles" above any man-made order.84  The Post-
Soviet states instead have adhered to a "rechtsstaat," or positive man-made
76. Joanna Regulska, Self-Governance or Central Control? Rewriting Constitutions in
Central and Eastern Europe, in CONSTITUTION MAKING IN EASTERN EUROPE 133, 149 (A.E.
Dick Howard, ed., 1993).
77. Ludwickowski, supra note 27, at 39-40.
78. Pdter Paczolay, Traditional Elements in the Constitutions of Central and East
European Democracies, in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 109, 118 (Martin Krygier
and Adam Czarnota, eds., 1999).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Ludwickowski, supra at note 27, at 201.
83. Graiyna Skapska, Between "Civil Society" and "Europe": Post-Classical
Constitutionalism after the Collapse of Communism in a Socio-Legal Perspective, in THE
RULE OF LAW IN CENTRAL EUROPE, supra note 62, at 212-13.
84. Id. at 212.
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system of law while forming their constitutions. In a positive system,
fundamental concepts such as human rights flow from the commands of a
supreme sovereign, 86 and not from a natural order or "God-given" right.
This may indicate that the populations of these nations are more vulnerable
to authoritarian rule, where rights are defined by the state and where
individuals see their rights subordinated to society's interests.
Constitutions served a different purpose during communist rule in the
former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. Communist regimes adopted
constitutions but typically ignored their principles.87 Socialist constitutions
generally provided laundry lists of rights, but not causes of action that an
individual could claim against the state.88 The state used constitutions
primarily to maintain order and legitimize communist rule, and not to
protect individual freedoms.89 Central and Eastern European constitutions,
modeled after the Soviet blueprint, instead imposed duties, not freedoms,
on individuals and rejected distinctions between public and private
realms. 90 The concentration of power and the subordination of lower
powers to higher ones replaced separation of powers. 91 Rewriting socialist
constitutions today thus involves introducing a hitherto absent democratic
principle - providing individual freedoms and rights separate from the
state.
Lukashenka's reluctance to welcome a shift to the rule of law is not
surprising. He is a "former Communist functionary in the classic mould"
who uses a Soviet-style economic system, and who wishes to again merge
with Russia.92 He now wants his regime to assume the sovereign role once
held by the communist party; in essence, to replace one authoritarian
regime with another. Lukashenka's willingness to modify and even ignore
the Belarusian constitution only conforms to the centralized tradition in
which he and his colleagues thrived during Soviet times. This poses a
question: is it possible for Belarus to divorce itself from nearly a century of
Soviet constitutional ideology? Besides Lukashenka, can the people and
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Regulska, supra note 76, at 133.
88. Ludwickowski, supra note 27, at 39-40.
89. Regulska, supra note 76, at 133.
90. Id. at 134.
91. Id.
92. Iron-man Lukashenko Stands Strong at Home Despite Europe Travel Snub, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESS, Nov. 19, 2002; See also Lukashenko Defends Russia-Belarus Union After
Putin Criticism, AGENCE FRANCE PRESS, June 18, 2002; Proposed Merger Between Russia
and Belarus Not Received Well by Belarus President, (National Public Radio: Morning
Edition, Aug. 16, 2002), available at LEXIS News.
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government of Belarus learn to view constitutions not as conduits for
government control, but as a guard of individual freedoms?
2. Social-historical barriers to the rule of law
Cultural pessimism philosophy suggests post-communist societies
"lack important cultural prerequisites" for liberal achievements, 93 such as
the rule of law. These factors make these states "inhospitable to grafts of
constitutionalism, democracy, or anything else it is from the West that
seems desirable in, but absent, from the East., 94 Such factors include a
poorly developed middle class and a lack of legality, democracy, and
tolerance. 95 The presence of these factors may determine the ease of a
state's transfer to constitutionalism.
For example, Poland's largely successful transition to constitutional
democracy may stem from the state's respected constitutional tradition,
which dates back to the Middle Ages. 9 6  Hungary also has a long
constitutional history dating back to the "Golden Bull" royal edict that
assured liberties similar to those in the Magna Carta.97 Hungary's post-
Soviet constitutional court is active and influential, and "proved to be the
most dominant element in the development of state law in Hungary.9" The
former Czechoslovakia is another example of successful transition. It
attempted to build a democratic constitutional system between the two
world wars, but the Soviet Union stifled its efforts after the Second World
War.
99
The repulsion of communism from Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia thus involved a return to their pre-existing Western-style
constitutional traditions. Belarus has no such constitutional tradition to
guide its transition. Russia occupied the above nations only after the
Second World War; Russia occupied Belarus, however, for much longer,
beginning in the 18th century. 100 Belarus declared independence in 1918,
only to be "forcibly absorbed" into the Soviet Union by the Bolsheviks
93. See Martin Krygier, Institutional Optimism, Cultural Pessimism and the Rule of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 78, at 86.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Paczolay, supra note 78, at 114.
97. Id.
98. Vilmos S6s, The Paradigm of Constitutionalism: The Hungarian Experience, in
THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 78, at 137-38.
99. Paczolay, supra note 78, at 114.
100. U.S. Department of State, supra at note 25.
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soon thereafter.' 0 ' The only break in Russian occupation until 1990
occurred during the Second World War, when the Nazis occupied the
country. 1
02
In the words of Martin Krygier, "not everything one does is
determined by the environment... [o]n the other hand, it is difficult to
walk away."'10 3 For the rule of law to succeed, the "people must care about
what the law says" and not "merely comply resentfully" when they fear
punishment. 10 4  The failure of Belarus to establish a constitutional
democracy is thus not surprising. Centuries of monarchy, followed by
communism, accustomed the Belarusian people to authoritarian regimes,
making the state particularly vulnerable to Lukashenka's bald assertions of
executive power. No constitutional tradition guides Belarus during these
crucial decades after independence from the Soviet Union. Thus,
constitutional democracy will prove difficult to establish, if not impossible,
in Belarus and other former Soviet Union states.
3. Is Lukashenka entirely to blame?
At first glance one is tempted to blame Lukashenka exclusively for
Belarus' reversion to authoritarianism. There remains little doubt that the
president, since his regime took power in 1994, has greatly increased
executive authority at the expense of the court and parliament, and
curtailed civil rights. Yet despite his abuses and the faltering economy,
Lukashenka retains at least passive support among many Belarusians.'0 5 In
the 2001 election, even an opponent's tally gave the president 46.7% of the
vote. 10 6 Other sources claim Lukashenka enjoys the "unwavering support"
of approximately 40% of the population.'0 7 Indeed, public perception of the
rule of law has changed little since independence; the majority of
Belarusians "still maintain the old Soviet approach to law: the boss is
always right, the law stands alone, and so does life itself."'0 8
B. Constitutional Origins: East vs. West
The historical context of constitution formation in post-communist
Europe differed significantly from that in which the classical constitutions
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Krygier, supra note 93, at 89.
104. Id.
105. Burger, supra note 35, at 133.
106. Id. at 123.
107. Lukashuk, supra note 4, at 43.
108. Id. at 45.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
formed. 10 9 Economic interests such as fair taxes, tariffs, customs duties,
and property rights served as the impetus for constitutional formation in
France and the United States, and for the establishment of a constitutional
order in Great Britain.11 ° The "civil society" interests behind the classical
revolutions focused on economic freedoms and promoted a strong, but
limited government to protect these freedoms. 111  In contrast, moral
concerns dominated the "peaceful revolutions" in former Soviet Union
states such as Belarus." 2 Reformers prioritized civil liberties and social
welfare rights during initial constitutional formation; although most post-
communist constitutions eventually included free market principles, these
principles were included for theoretical and not pragmatic reasons."13
For example, the 1994 Belarusian constitution enshrined the right to
retraining when unemployed, 1 4 the right of workers to vacation," 5 and the
right to free health care.1 6 Despite ostensibly protecting property rights,"
17
the Belarusian constitution conforms to the post-communist pattern of
emphasizing the moral obligations of government over pragmatic economic
concerns. Commentators noted that drafts of the constitution contained no
preferences towards either a market economy or a socialist model." 8
The author does not suggest that Belarus and other post-communist
states should not have emphasized human rights during forming their
constitutions, or imply disingenuous drafting or morally flawed
constitutional construction by Belarusian reformers. Rather, the author
only claims Belarus lacked a component crucial to the success of the
classical constitutions. Although deserving protection, social welfare rights
may not provide a complete, pragmatic foundation upon which to build
constitutions and governments.
The concept of judicial review in the United States serves as an
example of the complex and long legitimization process needed to protect
social welfare rights. The formation of the United States and the success of
judicial review is widely regarded as rooted in the economic and political
elite's acceptance of judicial review "as a minor cost" of protecting the
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division of power. 1 9 In fact, almost all cases reviewed by the United States
Supreme Court in its formative years involved protecting free trade.1 20 The
Court's service of these interests for a century and a half built the
legitimacy needed to advance civil rights during the New Deal and Warren
court era.
12 1
Thus, promoting civil rights and protecting against authoritarianism in
Belarus may require more than expressing these principles in a written
document, and then trusting those in power to implement the principles.
The document and its enforcing entity must build legitimacy by serving
vested societal interests such as free trade. Belarusian civil society lacks
such cohesive interests after centuries of Russian imperial domination and
a further seventy-five years of authoritarian socialism. Hopes for basic
livelihood and civil liberties will not likely provide the practical impetus
necessary to foster a legitimate Western-style constitutional legal
framework.
IV. Barrier Three: Cultural and Structural Flaws in the
Belarusian Judicial System
A. Court culture and the Soviet Union's judicial legacy
As Section III. A. discussed above, Soviet constitutions maintained a
highly centralized power structure lacking the separation of powers present
in most Western governments. In Soviet systems, special councils within
parliament interpreted a constitution designed to maximize the power of the
Communist party. 122  Judicial review was mostly incompatible with
traditional Soviet legal theory, which considered judicial review a
manipulative instrument of big capital. 23  However, these systems
generally began warming to the concept of judicial review as early as the
1950's, especially in the area of administrative action challenges, but "the
role of judicial review as an instrument for protection of constitutional
rights of individuals was largely symbolic."'124 In the Soviet Union, the
1977 constitution permitted resorting to courts, but the practice "was rarely
119. Martin Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 193, 206 (Sally J. Kenney, William Reisinger & John C. Reitz,
eds., 1999).
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exercised" because the document did not specifically state when review
was permitted. 25 The right to judicial review was, in practice, reserved to
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet - a practice Ludwickowski refers to
as "internal" constitutional review. 1
26
Current Russian commentators commonly feel post-Soviet judicial
systems lack "legal orientations that support the rule of law.' 127 Most
Belarusian judges have continued to serve under Lukashenka's regime
"with little if any embarrassment," and have retained an "instinctual
subservience" to the Soviet "the boss is always right" approach to law. 
28
B. Belarusian courts' lack of independence
Throughout Soviet history both high and low-level political authorities
could influence important court cases. As Reisinger states, "when the
stakes were high, the legal system was not independent and neutral.' 29
Mikhail Gorbachev frequently spoke out against political interference with
the courts and established a commission to review constitutionality of
legislation.130 Positive treatment of judicial review did not come easily to
the Soviet legal community.'13  Communist party organs generally vetted
judges at all levels. 132
The 1994 Belarusian constitution guarantees a "competent,
independent, and impartial" court, and the 1996 constitution states
something similar.' 33 Furthermore, the constitution enshrines the
subordination of the courts to the law. However, one commentator feels
that many current Belarusian judges have forgotten about their judicial
duty, and are now subordinated not to the law, but to the president. 34
Judges are dependent on the President's vertical command, as Lukashenka
reserves the right to appoint and remove judges, and also controls the
financial and material support given to courthouses. 135 In addition, judges
must pass a five-year probationary period after approval, leaving them
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uncertain of their future. 136 Judges "have largely ceased to be organs of
justice" because of these factors.' 37 Turnover rates show the politicization
of the judiciary; as of 2000, forty percent of judges had held office for less
than three years. 1
38
Belarus' highest court - the Constitutional Court - has also changed in
reaction to Lukashenka's expanding judicial control. Judges enjoy not
lifetime tenure, but eleven-year terms. 139 The President now recommends
six of twelve judges and also the court's chair - who then recommends the
other six judges to parliament. 40 A United Nations Special Rapporteur on
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers concluded, "the Constitutional
Court cannot possibly be seen as independent of the executive."'
14
'
Lack of judicial independence removes a major obstacle from
Lukashenka's continued push for complete authoritarian rule. His wide use
of presidential decrees and nearly complete control over the judiciary
means the separation of powers is little healthier in Belarus than under
communist rule. Thus, all that has changed is the pretext for
authoritarianism. However, Lukashenka's regime is perhaps more dubious.
Where Soviet leaders oppressed their people under the pretext of
communism, Lukashenka's regime oppresses beneath a fagade of
democracy.
Promoting the judiciary's independence will require fundamental
changes in the current political and legal systems, over which Lukashenka
presently holds absolute control. The National Congress of Democratic
Forces in Belarus, convened in Minsk in 1997, declared the only way out of
the legal crisis is restoring the 1994 Constitution. 142 The Congress also
outlined three steps needed to dismantle authoritarianism in Belarus.
143
First, parliamentary elections must be held in the electoral districts
prohibited by Lukashenka in 1996.144 Second, the constitution must be
revised "on the basis of procedures contained within it," and using the
recommendations of a constitutional commission appointed by
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parliament. 145 Third, Belarus must hold new parliamentary and presidential
elections based on new electoral laws passed by the new parliament.
146
Pastukhov considers the Congress' recommendations "an intelligent and
civilized way out of the legal crisis... after the enactment of the
'presidential' constitution." 147
Conclusion
Constitutional law and democracy cannot flourish under the regime of
Alexander Lukashenka. In the first decade of his leadership, Lukashenka
showed a clear intent to establish a supreme executive, and blatantly
subordinated the parliament, courts, and constitution to his rule. His
willingness to ignore and change the constitution betrays his hostility
towards the rule of law and cooperative governance. The president's
control over the media and political machine all but ensure the victory of
his chosen successor and continued authoritarianism. His suppression of
the free press and opposition candidates in the 2001 presidential election
sets a dangerous precedent during the formative years of Belarus' post-
communist period.
Belarus voters' passive support of Lukashenka - despite his
oppressive leadership - and Belarus' long history of monarchic and
authoritarian rule present the next largest barriers to the rule of law.
Indifference and compliance give Lukashenka just enough legitimacy to
justify his election victories and pass referendums - which in turn allow
him to amend the constitution. However, recent polls show Lukashenka's
support may be waning- a4 Continued economic deterioration of
Lukashenka's Soviet-style economic model may provide Belarusians with
the impetus to remove him or reject his successor. In addition, the
president's 2001 reelection means he can no longer blame his enemies for
his failings - in essence, he will be "[held] hostage to his victory.' 49
But a question remains even if a new regime replaces Lukashenka's: is
it already too late for the rule of law in Belarus? Former Belarus
Constitutional Court Judge Mikhail Pastukhov, as quoted earlier, believes
restoring the 1994 Constitution and the pre-referendum 13th Supreme
Soviet is necessary for reform. But would a new executive willingly
concede power back to the judiciary and parliament in the tussle of
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Thuburn, supra note 4.
149. Burger, supra note 35, at 154-55.
[Vol. 28:165
2004] Descent into Authoritarianism 165
realpolitik? Such reform would require enormous restraint and political
foresight. Lukashenka has stalled reform by tainting the early stages of
Belarusian independence with cynicism and political opportunism. But
deeper than Lukashenka's damage lies the real challenge: overcoming
centuries of authoritarian influence on every aspect of Belarusian
government and society.
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